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COMMENTARIES

DECONSTRUCTING A WATER PROJECT'
ALISON MAYNARD"*
INTRODUCTION

The Animas-La Plata water project ("ALP" or "Animas-La Plata") has
been on the Bureau of Reclamation's drawing board for Southwestern
Colorado for over fifty years. If constructed as originally planned (in two
phases) it will be enormous. Phase 1 involves construction of a large
reservoir known as "Ridges Basin." The Bureau will divert 25% of the
flow of the Animas River and pump it uphill 500 feet, at a cost of
approximately $710 million, to fill this reservoir. This phase will require
years of earthmoving to construct pumping stations, as well as miles of
tunnels

and pipelines.

It

will also cause

severe

and irreparable

environmental damage to the Animas River, one of the last free-flowing
rivers in the West. Phase 2 involves pumping water out of Ridges Basin
upward, once again, to the west over Red Mesa. Some of this water will
be dumped in the La Plata River to increase flows for downstream

irrigation, and some will be pumped another 400 feet higher and several
more miles west to irrigate what is known as the "Dry Side."

Because of opposition to the project, backers have proposed
smaller versions since the early 1990s. One, "ALP-Lite," would have
+ This article has been adapted from a memorandum Ms. Maynard wrote for the
Citizens Progressive Alliance in January 1999. That memorandum, in part, constituted
a legal analysis of issues identified earlier by Mr. Richard Hamilton in a monograph
dated September 30, 1997. Mr. Phillip Doe, a retired former official of the Bureau of
Reclamation and board member of CPA, supplied additional factual background for
the present article. Ms. Maynard wishes to express her appreciation for his assistance.
" Ms. Maynard practices primarily water and land use law from her offices in
Capitol Hill, Denver, representing citizens' groups and environmental organizations.
She is a 1976 graduate of Cornell University (where she majored in physics), a 1986
graduate of the University of Denver College of Law, a former geophysicist, and a
former Assistant Attorney General for the State of Colorado, in the water unit. Ms.
Maynard was the trial attorney in Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado Water
Conservation Board, 901 P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1995), pro bono; performed the legal services
which resulted in the formation, by election in 1997, of the Center of Colorado Water
Conservancy District in Park County; and brought a series of suits against the Park
County Commissioners in 1995-98 on behalf of various citizens' groups, which were
instrumental in the recall of all three commissioners in February 1998. Ms. Maynard
served for four years on the Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar Association.
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been only 6% smaller than the original ALP. Project proponents and
the Department of Interior are allegedly working out the details of its
successor, "ALP-Ultralite," in secret. "ALP-Ultralite" will, at the least,
still require construction of Ridges Basin Reservoir. In all likelihood,
this project will mirror its predecessors in size.
Originally, Animas-La Plata was proposed strictly as an irrigation
project, without any reference to Ute Indian reserved water rights.
Indeed, several federal water projects already exist in the area, which not
only meet the Utes' water needs but have capacities greatly exceeding
those needs. The Bureau of Indian Affairs built a network of ditches in
the last century to irrigate the lands allotted to tribal members, and those
ditches divert substantial amounts of water, with priority number 1, from
the Pine River. In the early 1940's, the federal government built the Pine
River Project, consisting of Vallecito Reservoir-with one-sixth of its
water supply dedicated to the needs of the Southern Utes-and the
Florida Project, a small portion of which serves Indian water needs.
The water from the Pine River ditches and Vallecito Reservoir is
more than adequate to serve the residential needs of the Southern Ute
Indians-approximately 1,300 people-as well as to irrigate 14,000 acres
of land. A portion of the irrigation water goes unused by the Indians,
however, because of the area's marginal crop yield. In fact, Vallecito
Reservoir has recently been the subject of bills transferring it to private
ownership, and converting its use from irrigation to municipal and
industrial. Such legislation would enable the new owner, the Pine River
Irrigation District, to avoid federal restrictions on such conversions.
For the Ute Mountain Utes, in the 1980s the federal government
constructed the Dolores Project, one fourth of which, or 24,700 acre-feet,
is for the exclusive use of that tribe. This amount of water would satisfy
the residential water requirements of 123,500 people. However, the Ute
Mountain Ute tribe consists of only a little over 2,000 people. Finally,
Navajo Reservoir, a mainstream reservoir on the San Juan River with
1,500,000 acre-feet of storage capacity, sits adjacent to the Southern Ute
Reservation and upstream of the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation. It is
highly likely3 this reservoir also could be used to satisfy any water needs of
both tribes.
The three completed federal water projects on the Pine, Florida, San
Juan, and Dolores Rivers cost about $1.1 billion in 1999 dollars, almost
all of which will be paid by taxpayers, not project beneficiaries. The Utes
do not use much of the water from these existing projects, nor are they
able to make use of the quantities available. Thus, there is no need for
yet another reservoir project in Southwestern Colorado to meet Indian
needs for irrigation or domestic use, certainly not one that would cost
1. See Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Interior,
No. 99-WM-808 (D. Colo., filed Apr. 23, 1999).
For more information, see
<http://angelfire.com/al/alpcentral/>.
2. Possibly a very large portion; we have been unable to get reliable information.
3. Such an eventuality would have to be negotiated with the Navajo Nation, however,
since it claims all the water of the SanJuan River.
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taxpayers another $710 million, and possibly three times that if the
history of overruns which have afflicted similar federal water projects is
repeated.
As mentioned, when originally proposed, the purpose of Animas-La
Plata was to serve Western irrigators. The Utes were not major
participants. Only within the past twelve to fifteen years or so has the
project become "clothed in the Indian blanket'; and, at the same time,
its purpose changed from irrigation to municipal and industrial use.
This "Indian blanket" has had great practical usefulness to the promoters
of Animas-La Plata, who, based on lessons they learned from the Dolores
Project, now advance Indian interests tojustify construction of ALP. The
proponents argue that the Utes have a large (unquantified) reserved
water right with an 1868 priority-the date of their treaty with the United
States government establishing their reservation. Due to the threat this
"senior reserved water right" putatively poses to established patterns of
water use among non-Indians in Southwestern Colorado, interested
parties, including the tribes, the State of Colorado, the United States
Departments of Interior and Justice, and numerous local governmental
entities, entered into a "settlement" of the Utes' claims in water court in
1986.! The settlement confesses the existence of an 1868 reserved water
right, but subordinates it to the 1966 adjudication date of Animas-La
Plata. In return for the subordination, 29,900 acre-feet of project water is
dedicated to the Southern Utes, and 26,000 acre-feet to the Ute
Mountain Utes, almost all of which is for municipal and industrial use
specifically, which the Utes may sell for use off their reservations. The
settlement was subsequently authorized by an Act of Congress 6in 1988,5
court.
and decreed on stipulated motion by the Division 7 water
The "Indian blanket" in which ALP is clothed has also had great
political usefulness to its promoters, since no one can dispute that the
history of the United States' treatment of the Utes in the last century,
possibly even more than its treatment of other Indian tribes, was one of
dishonor and disgrace-a greedy theft of resources accomplished under
color of law. Yet one can dispute that justice requires reparation be
made to the Utes for these wrongs in the form of this particular water
project.
Although an agreement has been struck by interested parties in
order to smooth the road for Animas-La Plata-and there are now both a
stipulated water court decree and an Act of Congress enshrining that
agreement-the point of this article is to show that no consideration
supported the agreement. The law is clear that the Southern Utes do
not have a reserved water right with an 1868 priority, and common sense
4. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement, December 10,
1986.
5. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585,
102 Stat. 2973 (1988).
6. In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America
(Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribes), Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 7, Colo. 1991) (No. W1603-76F).
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dictates that a costly water project not be built to satisfy a nonexistent
claim.
THE UTES Do NOT HAVE AN 1868 RESERVED WATER RIGHT
The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that the Ute
Reservation, created in 1868, was extinguished by the Act of Congress of
June 15, 1880.' The Court interpreted that Act (which was supported by
the Agreement of 1880 between the Utes and the United States
government) to extinguish all "right, title, [and] interest" of the
Southern Ute Tribe in the Ute reservation.' Consequently, the Winters
right9 impliedly reserved at the time the reservation was created was also
extinguished.
The Supreme Court detailed the history of this forfeiture in its
opinion. It begins with the creation of the reservation in 1868, when the
Confederated Bands of Utes, composed of the Uncompahgre Utes, the
White River Utes, and the Southern Utes, exchanged their aboriginal
lands in New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado for a reservation of
approximately 15.7 million acres lying wholly within Colorado. The
reservation was subsequently almost severed in 1874 by the "Brunot
Cession" of 3.7 million acres of the east-central portion after valuable
mineral deposits were discovered there. 0
In 1879, members of the White River Ute band of Utes murdered
Indian Agent Meeker and others at the White River Station in Western
Colorado." Public outcry over this incident led to the June 15, 1880 Act
of Congress, terminating tribal ownership in the reservation lands.' The
Act caused the cession to the United States of all acreage not already
allotted to individual Indians, "except as hereinafter provided for their
settlement."' 3
The Supreme Court interpreted that language in
examining whether the Act of 1880 actually extinguished the reservation.
The Act "provided for the settlement" of the White River Utes in Utah
and the Uncompahgre Utes along the Grand River, unless insufficient
agricultural land was found there, in which case they would also go to
Utah (which they soon did)."4 As to the Southern Utes, the Act provided
that they were to
remove to and settle upon the unoccupied agricultural lands on the
La Plata River, in Colorado; and if there should not be a sufficiency of
such lands on the La Plata River and in its vicinity in Colorado, then
7. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159 (1971).
8. Id. at 160.
9. In Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court held that water rights, in
sufficient quantity to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, are impliedly reserved for
the benefit of the Indians at the time a reservation is created. Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
10. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 159.
11. Id.at 162.
12. Id. at 162-63.
13. Id. at 163.
14. Id.
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upon such other unoccupied agricultural lands as may be found on
the La Plata river or in its vicinity in New Mexico.' 5
The Southern Utes thus continued to occupy the area of their former
reservation known as Royce Area 617.
The United States Court of Claims, from which the appeal to the
Supreme Court was taken, held that the United States, in acquiescing in
the continued occupancy of Royce Area 617 by the Southern Utes, had
waived its rights created in the 1880 Act "whatever [those rights] were."' 6
The Supreme Court reversed this holding, finding no such waiver, and
expressly concluded that, despite the language, "except as hereinafter
provided for their settlement," the entire reservation was extinguished in
1880.17

Although the Act of 1880 terminated tribal ownership, 8 Indians
could still own such former reservation land as might be allotted in
severalty to individual Indians. All of the land not allotted to individual
Indians-the remaining portion of the former reservation-was released
and conveyed to the United States, to be held as public lands subject to
disposal for the Utes' financial benefit. 9
The question whether the Tribe's 1868 reserved water rights survived
the extinguishment of the reservation itself must be answered in the
negative. Winters v. United States held that, since the purpose of Indian
reservations was to convert the Indians from a "nomadic and uncivilized
people," to a settled, agricultural people, ° the government must have
intended to reserve water adequate for the irrigation of reservation lands
when the reservation was created. Since Winters, a reserved water right
sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the reservation (including now
not only Indian reservations, but other federal reservations such as
reservations for forests, national parks, and the like) has been deemed
vested with a priority as of the date of the reservation itself.2' Although
an Indian reserved water right must be considered to have sprung into
existence on the Ute Reservation as of 1868 pursuant to Winters,
therefore, it was extinguished by the Act of 1880. A water fight is an
interest in real property. The Winters right was unquestionably included
in "all the right, title, interest, estate, claims, and demands of whatsoever
nature in and to the land and property"2 2 of the Southern Ute Tribe in
their reservation, ceded in its entirety to the United States. 'Where the
grantor conveys all of his interest without qualification, his entire right is
15. Id. at 159 (quoting Act ofJune 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199, 200 (1880)).
16. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d 346, 356 (1970)
(Skeltonj., dissenting), rev'd, 402 U.S. 159 (1971).
17. United States v. Southern Ue Tribe or Band of Indians,402 U.S. at 163-64, 174.
18. Id. at 162-63.
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
21. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963); United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696, 698 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
22. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians, 402 U.S. at 159 (quoting Act of

June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199, 200 (1880)).
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transferred, since the word 'interest' is regarded as the broadest term
applicable to claims in and on real property, and a like rule is applicable
to a conveyance of 'all right, title, and interest.' 23 Moreover, because a
reserved water right is measured exclusively by the "practicably irrigable
acreage" of the reservation, not by the "number of Indians, '' 4 as soon as
there was no longer any acreage to irrigate there was no longer a
reserved water right.
Two lower courts have expressly agreed with the conclusion that,
upon cession of an Indian reservation to the government and opening of
that land to homesteading, the Winters right is extinguished. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reached this result in United States v. Anderson,25
in determining, among other issues, whether the Spokane Indian
Reservation, which was ceded to the government, opened to
homesteading, then subsequently reacquired by the Tribe, carried a
reserved water right with an original date-of-the-reservation priority. 6
The Ninth Circuit held it did not.2 The Tribe had a reserved water right,
but its priority was the date of the Tribe's reacquisition of their lands.8
The court found this conclusion was required by the Supreme Court's
determination, based on the Desert Lands Act, that a homesteader
acquires no federal water right incident to the transfer of public lands
into private ownership.29 The Ninth Circuit stated:
Application of this rule to the case before us would terminate the
availability of Winters rights on those reservation lands which have
been declared public domain, opened to homesteading, and
subsequently conveyed into private ownership.
This result is

23. 26 CJ.S. Deeds, §104(c) (1956) (footnotes omitted).
24. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600, 601.
25. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 1361. This is a different question from whether a reserved water right
attached to lands allotted to Indians while those lands were still part of the reservation;
and, if so, whether that water right can be transferred to non-Indians and still retain its
original priority date. The answer to both parts of this question is yes, since an allottee has
a reserved right which is derivative of the tribe's. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527,
532 (1939) (Indian allottees are entitled to "use some portion of tribal waters essential for
cultivation" of their reservation); Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362; State of Wyoming v. Owl
Creek Irrigation Dist., 753 P.2d 76, 114 (Wyo. 1988). If the lands left reservation status,
however, allotments made after that time did not carry a reserved water right. Water
could be appropriated for such lands only pursuant to state law. Owl Creek, 753 P.2d at
114. Accord Grey v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285 (1990) (the right to an individual share in
tribal water is not the same thing as an entitlement to a reserved water right for the
individual allotment); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1326
(E.D. Wash. 1978), affJd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (at the time a tribal member acquires an
allotment, he takes a proportionate share of the tribe's reserved rights). The principles
governing the reserved rights of allotments to members of the Southern Ute tribe made
prior to June 15, 1880, is believed unimportant for purposes of this article, since the
Southern Ute Tribe does not base its claim to an 1868 priority on tribal reacquisition of
such allotments.
27. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1361.
28. Id. at 1363.
29. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 15556, 158 (1935).
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supported by the fact that Winters rights were only intended to assist
in accomplishing the needs of the reservation; where the land has
been removed from the Tribe's possession and conveyed to a
homesteader, the purposes for which Winters rights were implied are
eliminated. Therefore, a homesteader is not entitled to rely on the
Winters doctrine. The appropriation doctrine will serve as the source
of his water rights.
Where the homesteader has no perfected water rights or has lost
rights which were perfected, there are no rights to be regained by the
Indians on reacquisition of the property. This principle protects the
intervening rights, if any, that may have been acquired in good faith
by third party water users during
the homesteading process and prior
30
to reacquisition by the Tribe.
The Wyoming
Supreme Court followed this rule in 1995 in In re Big Horn
311
River, stating:
When the Tribes ceded their land to the United States for sale, the
reserved water right disappeared because the purpose for which it was
recognized no longer pertained. That purpose no longer existed for
lands acquired by others after they had been ceded to the United
States for disposition. The effect is that the reserved water rights were
eliminated as to those tracts.32
One of the appellants in the Big Horn River case argued that while
Congress had the power to terminate Indian rights, 33 it had not done so

since its intent was not express; yet, the Wyoming court found a
termination. In the Southern Ute case, not even that argument can be
made since Congress did express its intent to terminate Indian rights in
the Act of June 15, 1880. It was a harsh consequence for the Utes, but
extinguishment of the reservation and termination of Indian rights are
what the Supreme Court held Congress intended to accomplish.34 The
Court was influenced by a line of court cases brought by the Utes in the
20th century, resulting in consent judgments that the Tribe had
admitted constituted full compensation for their property interests which

30. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363 (citation omitted).
31. In re Big Horn River, 899 P.2d 848 (Wyo. 1995).
32. Id. at 854.
33. See United States v. State of Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13
(1968).
34. It is Congress' unequivocal language in the 1880 Act which similarly distinguishes
the Southern Ute case from the situation presented in United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984), where the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether a reserved water right for fishing
purposes survived when the Klamath Tribe was terminated pursuant to the Klamath
Termination Act of 1954. Id. at 1428. The Court found that it did, because there is a
substantive exception in the Klamath Termination Act which states that nothing in that
Act shall be deemed to abrogate any water rights reserved to the Tribe, or fishing rights.
Id. at 1412. No similar water rights "saving clause" was inserted in the Act of June 15,
1880. The Southern Utes' reserved water rights, thus, did not survive.
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had been improperly disposed of by the government. In 1938 the
federal government also restored the Tribe's as-yet-undisposed-of lands
from their original reservation.
THE SOUTHERN UTES ARE DUE No REPARATIONS

In 1950, the Confederated Bands of Utes and the United States
government entered into a settlement of six cases the Utes had pending
in the United States Court of Claims." The Utes claimed compensation
for property interests which had been taken from them in violation of
section 3 of the 1880 Act, which provided that the ceded lands were to be
disposed of for cash only, with the proceeds applied to the Utes' financial
benefit. 6 The decisions in these Court of Claims cases and the history
behind them-including two earlier Court of Claims decisions-are
pertinent to understanding the Supreme Court decision of 1971. 7
In 1909, Congress passed ajurisdictional act permitting the Court of
Claims to hear the Utes' claims that the United States had failed to carry
out the terms of the 1880 Agreement."' Pursuant to that jurisdictional
act, the Utes brought suit against the United States to recover the
proceeds of cash sales for lands formerly part of the reservation, which
had been sold as public lands without the proceeds' being credited to
the Utes; and as compensation for other lands from the former
reservation, which the government had set aside for its own use. In 1910,
the Utes received a judgment of $3,516,231.05, representing
compensation for more than 4.5 million acres. 9 In 1911, they received
an award of attorney fees in an amount equal to 6% of the judgment, or
$210,973.86. 40 More than seven million acres were still left subject to the
1880 agreement."
After the 1910 judgment, the government disposed of additional
large tracts of land still held by the United States under the terms of
section 3 of the 1880 Act through entry and sale, or appropriation for its
own use, without the required crediting to the Utes.42 The disposition of
these lands between 1910 and 1938 thus became the subject of another
suit for compensation by the Utes,3 permitted to be brought under a

35. See Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 433 (1950)
(consolidating Case Nos. 45585, 46640, 47564, and 47566). Two other cases, Nos. 47565
and 47567, were referred to in the General Accounting Office Report Re: Petition of the
ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians. These cases are unreported.
36. Id.
37. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians, 402 U.S. at 159.
38. Act of Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 263, 35 Stat. 781, 788-89 (1909) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
320 (1994).
39. Ute Indians v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 225 (1911), supplementing 45 Ct. Cl. 440
(1910); see also Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 413, 422
(1943).
40. UteIndians,46 Ct. Cl. at 227.
41. ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. at 422.
42. Id. at 418.
43. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 433, 436
(1950).
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second jurisdictional act promulgated for that purpose." The parties
stipulated to $6,037,567.72 plus interest for that taking.45
At that time, thousands of acres still remained undisposed of by the
government. In 1934 the Secretary of Interior, pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 46 believed he was authorized to
restore these "remaining surplus lands" to tribal ownership. He issued
two orders dated July 17 and November 13, 1937, purporting to restore
30,000 acres adjoining "the present reservation" (now known as the Ute
Mountain Ute reservation), and approximately 8,500 acres within and
lying north of Township 35 N, respectively.4" However, as detailed in
Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States,49 the restoration of many
of these lands, already included in grazing districts under the Taylor
Grazing Act, "created much alarm and uneasiness among the citizens of
western Colorado."' Thus, the "Adams Amendment" was offered to the
pending bill which became the Act ofJune 28, 1938. As finally passed,
with the Adams Amendment, the 1938 Act provided that there was to be
no restoration of any lands north of and including Township 35 N, and
provided that all prior orders purporting to restore such lands were
"rescinded and annulled."" The lands including and north of township
35 were in Royce Area 616. On September 14, 1938, the Secretary of
Interior then restored the remaining lands in Royce Area 617 to tribal
ownership, an area consisting of approximately 200,000 acres, described
as:
Townships 32, 33, and 34 North, Ranges 1-1s to 13 West, inclusive, of
the N.M.P.M., in Colorado, being that area lying between the north
boundary of the old Southern Ute Reservation and the south
boundary of the State of Colorado and extending west from the 107th
Meridian to the east boundary of the present Southern Ute
Reservation [now known as the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation] .

As mentioned, the 1938 Act provided that the Utes could sue the
United States for compensation for any "claims arising.., by reason of
any lands taken from them, without compensation ....
, Thus, even
44.

Act of June 28, 1938, ch. 776, 52 Stat. 1209 (1938) (codified as amended at 16

U.S.C. § 81(d) (1994).
45. ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. at 436.
46. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as

amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461-479 (1994)).
47. ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. at 419.
48.

Id. at 423.

49. Id. at 413.
50.

Id. at 419.

51.

Id. at 423-24.

52. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 413, 424 (1943). The
Act did, however, either ratify the Secretary's order, or legislatively transfer, the 30,000
acres, which was not within the prohibited area. Id.
53. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians,423 F.2d at 370.
54. Southern Ute Reservation, Colorado, Order of Restoration, 3 Fed. Reg. 1425

(1938).
55. Act of June 28, 1938, ch. 776, 52 Stat. 1209 (1938) (codified as amended at 16
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though 200,000 acres had now been restored to them in fee, the
Confederated Bands of Utes brought suit in the Court of Claims. Case
No. 45585 sought compensation for the taking of the undisposed-of land
lying within and north of T. 35 N which were the subject of the Adams
Amendment, so prohibited by law from being restored to the Southern
Utes.56 Case No. 46640 sought compensation for the lands disposed of
between 1885 and 1938. 57 Case No. 47564 sought compensation for
64,560 acres of land withdrawn in 1916 for naval oil reserves in Colorado,
for which the stipulated compensation totaled $623,686.18. 5s Case No.
47566 sought compensation (for unstated reasons) for 3,199,258 acres of
the same lands dealt with by the 1911 case, which had been set aside for
forest reserves. The compensation stipulated to was $803,826.48. 9 The
stipulations that settled these four cases, as well as two others which are
not reported,- are referred to as the "1950 consent judgments." The
total compensation awarded, not including attorney fees, was around $31
million (according to the Supreme Court). 6' The value of this judgment
in 1998 dollars is approximately $857 million.62
The 1971 Supreme Court decision in Southern Ute Tribe was
commenced in the Indian Claims Commission by the Southern Ute
Tribe alone the very year after the 1950 consentjudgments were entered,
in 1951.63 The Utes argued that the United States had violated its
fiduciary duty to the Tribe by disposing of 220,000 acres of land ceded to
it by the federal government as "free homesteads,"' although obligated
by the Acts of 1880 and 1895 to sell the acreage for the Tribe's benefit."'
The Tribe also sought an accounting for the proceeds from the sale of
82,000 acres, which, it alleged, were required, under the same Acts, to be
held for the Tribe's benefit.5 The government's defense was resjudicata:
because of the Tribe's entry into the 1950 consent judgments between
the United States and the Confederated Bands of Utes (which included
the Southern Utes), it was barred from bringing the 1951 claims. 66
The Supreme Court held in favor of the government, stating that the
Southern Utes had already been fully compensated for their loss. 67 In an
8-1 decision authored by Justice Brennan, the Court quoted from the
U.S.C. § 81(d) (1994).
56. See Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. CI. at 434. Two other
cases, Nos. 47565 and 47567, were referred to in the GAO Report, but no separate report
of these cases was found. See GeneralAccounting Office Report Re: Petition of the Confederated
Bands of Ute Indians.
57. ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. CI. at 437.
58. Id. at 439.
59. Id. at 440-41.
60. See supra, note 35.
61. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians, 402 U.S. at 159, n.2.
62. Computed by Professor Charles Howe of the University of Colorado
Department of Economics, assuming a rate of 3% interest compounded annually.
63. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 159.
64. Id. at 159-60.
65. Id. at 160.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 174.
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stipulation in ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians,which stated:
[T]hejudgment to be entered in this case is resjudicata,not only as to
the land described in Schedule 1, but, whether included therein or not,
also as to any land formerly owned or claimed by the plaintiffs in
western Colorado, ceded to defendant by the Act of June 15, 1880,
and by the defendant during the aforesaid periods of time sold for
cash, disposed of as free homesteads and set aside for public purposes
[between 1910 and 1938].68
The Supreme Court examined whether the Utes had either withheld
any lands from the 1880 cession, or acquired any land or interests in land
subsequent to the Act of June 15, 1880 which were subsequently ceded,
particularly given that they had continued to occupy Royce Area 617.69
The Utes maintained that there were such interests or rights for which
they had not been compensated by virtue of the 1950 consent decreesapproximately 230,000 acres of land in Royce Area 617.70 The Supreme
Court again disagreed, holding that no interest or right survived the
1880 cession, the subsequent improper disposition of which still
remained to be compensated. 7' The Court held that the 1950 consent
judgments were res judicata as to compensation to the Utes for the
taking of all property from the 1868 reservation which was "ceded to the
defendant by the Act of June 15, 1880," and that there were no other
cessions.72

The views expressed by Judge Skelton, the lone dissenting voice in
the Court of Claims in Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, appear to
In expressing his
have strongly influenced the Supreme Court.
disagreement with the result reached by his court, Judge Skelton stated:
I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority nor with the result
they reach. In my opinion, the Indians in this case, along with other
Southern Ute tribes, were paid $31,938,473.43 in 1950 for the
identical land involved here, together with other lands. This was the
largest judgment ever awarded by this court since it was established in
1855. The attorneys who represented the Indians in the recovery of
this tremendous judgment received an attorney fee of $2,800,000. See
ConfederatedBand of Ute Indians v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 609 (1951).
As will be seen in the following pages, the same Indians and the same
attorneys are before the court again in this case asking that they be
paid again (twice) for the same land, and the opinion of the majority
is going to allow them to get this double payment. This results, in my

68. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 161; Confederated
Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. C1. at 437 (some emphasis in original, some
added; citation omitted).
69. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians,402 U.S. at 163-64.
70. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d at 346 (the case
from which the appeal to the Supreme Court was taken).
71. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians,402 U.S. at 164.
72. Id. at 174.
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opinion, in a shocking giveaway of millions otdollars of public money
of the United States, and I cannot agree to it."
Judge Skelton then discussed the difficulty of assessing the particular
lands that were the subject of the consentjudgments:
The stipulation [which served as the basis for the 1950 consent
judgments] went on to describe a "Schedule 1," which contained the
legal descriptions of approximately 1,523,236.95 acres of land
embraced by the stipulation, saying: "So far as the parties with
diligence have been able to determine these descriptions represent
all the land so disposed of and set aside." This Schedule 1 contains
338 pages of single-spaced, typewritten legal descriptions of land. A
land expert would find it difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of
this Schedule 1. Even if he were to analyze it, months of his time
would be required in the process. When confronted with the
schedule of lands pursuant to settling case no. 46640, the government
only ran a spot check of the schedule, and concluded that while there
were errors, it was impractical to continue the examination.
Evidencing an obvious lack of reliance on the correctness and
completeness of Schedule 1, the stipulation signed by both parties
went on to state:
However, the judgment to be entered in this case is res judicata,
not only as to the land described in Schedule 1, but, whether
included therein or not, also as to any land formerly owned or
claimed by the plaintiffs in western Colorado, ceded to defendant by
the Act of June 15, 1880 by the defendant during the aforesaid
periods of time sold for cash, disposed of as free homesteads and
set aside for public purposes ....
One searches in vain for a more clear, a more precise 4 a more final
disposal and release of claims, than the one just quoted.
Judge Skelton then analyzed whether the land from Royce Area 617
in Southwestern Colorado was included in the comprehensive language
of the 1950 settlement, and concluded that it was. 75 The Supreme Court
adopted his analysis and conclusion, reversing the Court of Claims] 6
The United States Supreme Court holding is all the more important
in light of its recent decision in the coalbed methane gas (CBM) case.
In that case, the Southern Utes went back to court again to claim
ownership of CBM by virtue of their "ownership of the coal estate"
underlying approximately 200,000 acres of patented land in Royce Area
617.78 The CBM case is important here only for its tie to the reserved
73.

United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians,423 F.2d at 363.

74. Id. at 364 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 372.
United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 159.
77. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, No. 98-830, 1999 U.S. Lexis
4002 (1999), revg, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251
(10th Cir. 1998), affgen banc 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997), rev'g 874 F. Supp. 1142
(D. Colo. 1995), modifying 863 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Colo. 1994).
78. Amoco, 874F. Supp. at 1147.
76.
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water right question. In the CBM case, the district court held that the
Tribe's title to the coal estate derives from the 1909 and 1910 Coal Lands
Acts,79 by which the United States government reserved to itself the coal
in lands subject to homesteading. The United States then putatively
restored the coal estate to the Tribe by means of the 1938 restoration
order. The United States could reserve the coal estate to itself in 19091910 because the land was in the public domain, however, which can
only have been the case if the reservation had been extinguished.
District CourtJudge Babcock noted that:
The Supreme Court has left no doubt as to the meaning and effect of
the 1880 Act. "The central feature of the Act of 1880 was the
termination of tribal ownership in the reservation lands, and the

limitation of Indian ownership to such lands as might be allotted in
severalty to individual Indians. '
Both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit left this part of the
district court's order intact. Indeed, all parties adopted that conclusion
and, on appeal, agreed that tide to the coal estate derived from the 1909
and 1910 Coal Lands Acts and 1938 restoration order. 2 The only issue
appealed was whether CBM was included in the word "coal."" The
Tribe's position that an 1868 reserved water right exists (requiring
continuous existence of the reservation) is, thus, wholly inconsistent with
the way it claims title to the coal and coalbed methane gas (which
requires the reservation to have been extinguished).
THE "PINE RIvER DECREE" DOES NOT CONSTITUTEJUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF AN 1868 RESERVED WATER RIGHT

The proponents of Animas-La Plata have, in the past, argued that the
so-called "Pine River decree" constitutes judicial confirmation of the
existence of an 1868 reserved water right. For several reasons, that
conclusion is incorrect.
The Pine River decree arose from an action ("Case No. 7736")
brought in 1930 by the United States, on behalf of the Southern Utes, for
an injunction and to quiet title in the United States to ditches diverting
from the Pine River.14 The United States constructed the ditches in 1884
for irrigation of Southern Ute lands.85 The defendants in this case were
numerous non-Indian successors to Indian allottees who had been taking

79. Act of Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 270, 35 Stat. 844 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 81

(1994); Act of June 22, 1910, ch. 318, §§ 1, 3, 36 Stat. 583-84 (current version at 30
U.S.C. §§ 83, 85 (1994).
80. Amoco, 874 F. Supp. at 1151-52.

81.

Id. at 1148 (emphasis in original) (quoting Southern Ute Tribe, 402 U.S. at 163).

82. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians, 151 F.3d at 1256, n.2.
83. Id. at 1256.
84. United States of America v. Morrison Consol. Ditch Co., No. 7736 (D. Colo.
Oct. 25, 1930) [hereinafter Pine River Decree].
85. Stipulation, United States of America v. Morrison Consol. Ditch Co., No. 7736, at 2
(D. Colo.July 14, 1930). The Stipulation recites these efforts as having begun in 1870.
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water from the government's ditches to irrigate their allotments. 6 The
amount of water to which title was purportedly quieted was sufficient to
irrigate existing allotments, as well as lands held by the United States in
trust for future allotments; "purportedly" because, at the time of the
action, there had been no judicial confirmation of an appropriation (i.e.,
a decreed water fight) which would support such title.
The suit was settled by stipulation of the parties to entry of a decree
granting the United States the right, as against the defendants, to 213 cfs
of water for irrigation and domestic uses, 212 cfs of which was diverted
through the ditches on the Pine River, and 1 cfs of which was diverted
from Dry Creek, a tributary of the Pine, all with a priority ofJuly 25, 1868
(the date of Senate ratification of the 1868 treaty with the Utes)." The
decree establishes that the water is to be used for the irrigation of "16,966
acres of irrigable lands of the former Southern Ute Reservation lying
under said ditches, and for domestic purposes... ,,8These water rights
are "for the irrigation and domestic needs of the United States Indian
Agency and the lands heretofore allotted within the Southern Ute
Reservation susceptible of irrigation with water from Pine River.""9 Of
this amount, the United States was entitled to divert no more than 31.3
cfs for use on 2,505 acres of irrigable lands "on Indian allotments
purchased by persons not wards of the United States" (the defendants)
until such time as the defendants' priorities as among themselves could
be determined."0 Although the Pine River decree purports to assign a
priority to the United States' ditches, Case No. 7736 was not a water rights
adjudication, since it was not held to decide relative priorities among all
water diverters on the same stream."1 Instead, it was an injunction and
quiet title action-an in personam suit brought to determine only
whether the named defendants in the case had any right, vis-a-vis the
government, to divert from the government's ditches. 2
Case No. 7736 must, thus, be distinguished from a true federal water
rights adjudication, such as that described in Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States.93 In that case, the adjudication suit
attempted by the United States in federal court is described as one for a
declaration of the United States' rights vis-a-vis some 1,000 water users "in
certain rivers and their tributaries" in Water Division 7. "' [B]y reason of
the interlocking of adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order or
action affecting one right affects all such rights. Accordingly all water users

86. Pine River Decree, at 5, 1 3.
87. Id. at 5-6,113,6.
88. Id. at 5, 1 3 (emphasis added to show the parties knew, in 1930, that the
reservation was extinguished).
89. Id. at 3, 11.
90. Id. at 5-6,
4-5.
91. Id. at 5, 15.
92. Id. at5, 11,15.
93. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
94. Id. at 805.
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on a stream, in practically every case, are interested and necessary parties to any
court proceedings."'
In Case No. 7736, the court did not join all the water users on the
stream.
Instead, only those interested in taking water from the
government's ditches were present, and they all had an interest in
obtaining the earliest priority date possible (1868) for those ditches.
Such would not be the case in a true water rights adjudication, where the
parties would be competing with one another for the senior priority.
The 1868 priority date appears never to have been litigated. Even
though the State of Colorado, in the early 1930s, held its own general
adjudication of water rights within District 31,6 which includes the Pine
River, apparently (correctly) not recognizing the quiet title action in
federal court as an adjudication of water rights, the issue of the
government ditches' priorities relative to other water rights was still not
litigated. In District No. 31, the government's ditch rights were decreed
absolute only as to that amount of water that had been put to actual
beneficial use as of October 25, 1930." The rest of the water asserted in
the decree as divertible through the various ditches was not actually
being used, so was decreed conditional. 8
The District No. 31 decree reveals that the Ute ditches all shared the
number one priority (called "P-I"), with an appropriation date ofJuly 25,
1868 (the date of Senate ratification of the treaty with the Utes).9
However, the wording shows that the state court, in making this finding,
believed itself bound by the decree of the federal court in Case No.
7736' ° For example, in connection with the Buckskin Ditch ("Ditch No.
Ute-l"), the state court stated:
[T] he original construction of said ditch was commenced on the 1st
day of April, 1884; but that, under and by that certain decree entered
on October 25, 1930, by the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, in case numbered 7736 in said Court, entitled
the United States of America vs. the Morrison Consolidated Ditch
Company et all l the date of priority is therein fixed and decreed as of
July 25, 1868. 1

Even if the decree in District No. 31 is given effect by water users in
Colorado's Water Division 7, as it apparently has been, there are at least
three reasons why it has no precedential effect binding or determining

95. Id. at 811 (emphasis added) (quoting S.REP. No. 755, at 4-5 (1951)).
96. In the Matter of the Adjudication of Priorities of Water Rights for Irrigation in
District No. 31 (Pine River and its Tributaries), Decree of Adjudication, at 5 (Dist. Ct.,
Colo. 1934) (No. 1248) [hereinafter District No. 31].

97. Id. at 17.
98. Id. at 18. The division engineer's tabulation shows October 25, 1930 as the date of
adjudication, andjuly 25, 1868 as the date of appropriation.
99. Id. at 17.
100. The evidence relied on by the court may still exist in the case file in the La Plata
County district court, but does not exist in the State Engineer's Office in Denver, so was
not reviewed for this paper.
101. District No. 31, No. 1248 at 17 (emphasis added).
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any future claims for "reserved water rights with an 1868 priority" from
the Pine River, or any other river. First, the Pine River decree, upon
which the decree in DistrictNo. 31 depends, was not litigated, so does not
represent judicial confirmation of any fact therein. Its terms were
drafted by the parties themselves to settle the case, and are self-serving.
Second, the fact that it was an in personam injunction/quiet title action
meant the decree, by its nature, binds only the parties to the case. A
water rights adjudication, in contrast, is in rem and binding on the whole
world." Third, the Pine River decree itself contains a clear disclaimer.
The decree is carefully worded in order to avoid any implication that the
United States could ever again claim an 1868 priority for its diversions
from the Pine River, stating that the 213 cfs:
defines, limits, and settles forever all of the rights of the [United
States] to divert water from Pine River and its tributaries, under its
claim of priority of July 25, 1868, and also limits such rights to the
amount of water herein decreed to its several ditches above named,
respectively, for use upon the maximum acreage of lands herein
designated. Any ditches hereafter constructed or acquired, or water
diverted from The Pine River and its tributaries for the purpose of
irrigating other Indian lands than those irrigated or which may be
irrigated from the above-mentioned ditches, shall be entitled to and take

priority only as of the date of appropriation
03 and application of such water to a
beneficial use on such other Indian lands.1

Therefore, the "Pine River decree" by no means establishes any
precedent for other reserved water rights with an 1868 priority date on
any river.
CONCLUSION
Because, as a matter of law, the Southern Utes do not have a reserved
water right with an 1868 priority and have been fully compensated for
the loss of their property interests, there was no consideration for the
Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement of December 10,
1986,'0° upon which the stipulated water court decree for Animas-La
Plata, as well as the Act of Congress authorizing ALP's funding, are
based. A charitable view of this shortcoming is that the agreement was
based on mutual mistake. A less charitable view is that the agreement
was based on fraud, since the 1971 United States Supreme Court
decision was certainly known to the United States and the Southern Ute
Tribe, who were parties both in that case and to the 1986 Agreement. It
was, in fact, only one year after the Supreme Court decision was
rendered in 1971 that the United States filed its application on behalf of
102. If parties are summoned in a quiet title action by means of publication, such an
action will also be considered "in rem" and binding on the whole world, but still only as to
the title question. The mere fact that notice was published does not convert a quiet title

action into a water rights adjudication.
103. Morrison, No. 7736 at 10-11, 1 14 (emphasis added).

104. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement, December 10,
1986.
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the Tribe to quantify "1868 reserved water rights" in federal court.
The main objectionable feature of the 1986 Settlement Agreement,
in this writer's view, is that it reserves an enormous amount of water for
municipal and industrial uses-almost eight times the amount it reserves
for irrigation. Yet the measure and limit of a reserved water right is only
the "practicably irrigable acreage" of the reservation, in accordance with

the stated purposes of the law or executive order which created the
reservation. . In the case of the Southern Utes, as in the Fort Belknap
reservation considered in Winters, the purpose of the original reservation
was to provide the means for agriculture. 6 The Utes' treaty contains no
language, in contrast, expressing that Congress' purpose was to provide a
means for the Ute Indians to engage in real estate development, or to
sell their water off the reservation for such a purpose. Yet it is precisely
this practice which the seemingly innocuous terms "municipal and
industrial use" authorize, and for which the 1986 Agreement provides.
Thus, far more has been realized from the 1986 "settlement" of
reserved water rights than likely ever could have been achieved through
litigation. The final outcome makes clear that the beneficiaries of the
Animas-La Plata project must be somebody other than the handful of
tribal citizens in the area, who are already more than adequately served
with water. When the "Indian blanket" is stripped away, we see those
beneficiaries for who they really are: real estate developers.

105. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 546.
106. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Tabeguache, Muache,
Capote, Weeminuche, Yampa, Grand River, and Uintah Bands of Ute Indians, Mar. 2,
1868, 15 Stat. 619. The treaty's purposes were to:
insure the civilization of the bands entering into this treaty [by education of]
such of them as are or may be engaged in either pastoral, agricultural or other
peaceful pursuit of civilized life on said reservation ....
[F]or the purpose of inducing said Indians to adopt habits of civilized life
and become self-sustaining, the sum of forty-five thousand dollars, for the
first year, shall be expended ... in providing each lodge or head of a family
in said confederated bands with one gentle American cow.., and five head
of sheep ....
The treaty also provided for allotments of 160 acres of land for a head of household, and
80 acres for a person over 18, as they should elect, "for purposes of cultivation." Id. at
620-22 (emphasis added).

